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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 20, 1999, the International Center for Technology Assessment (ICTA) and a
number of environmental groups petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
regulate certain greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from new motor vehicles and engines.1 The
organizations argued that section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA)2 provided the EPA
Administrator with mandatory discretion to regulation GHG emissions.3 Petitioners contended
that statements made on the EPA’s website and other documents concluded that the emissions
they sought to control may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public welfare.4 They also
claimed that motor vehicle emissions from the GHGs could be significantly reduced by
increasing the fuel economy of vehicles, eliminating tailpipe emissions altogether, or using other
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1 Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922
(Environmental Protection Agency Sept. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Control of Emissions] (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 2).
2 Section 202 requires the Administrator to regulate emissions of any “air pollutant” from motor
vehicles where in the Administrator’s judgment such emissions contribute to air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
3 Control of Emissions, supra note 1, at 52,923. Petitioners specifically sought regulation of
carbon dioxide (CO[2]), methane (CH[4]), nitrous oxide (N[2]O) and hydrofluorocarbon (HFCs)
emissions. Id.
4 Control of Emissions, supra note 1, at 52,923.
2current and developing technologies. However, the EPA concluded that it did not possess the
legal authority to regulate the GHG emissions and denied their petition.5
In Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency6, the D.C. Circuit addressed the
issue of whether the Clean Air Act authorized the EPA Administrator to control GHG emissions
of new motor vehicles and engines. A three-judge panel voted 2-1 against reviewing the EPA’s
decision that it lacked authority under federal law to regulate GHGs.7 The majority held that the
Administrator properly exercised his discretion under section 202(a)(1) in denying the petition
for rulemaking.8 In an en banc hearing, the D.C. Circuit rejected a petition for rehearing.9 Late
last term, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear arguments to resolve this controversy.10
This comment asserts that the CAA authorizes the EPA to regulate GHG emissions from
new motor vehicles. The Court’s decision in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.11 held that if a statute was silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question became whether the agency’s action involved a permissible construction of the statute.
Part II discusses the historical background of climate change policy regarding GHG emissions.
Part III focuses on the various environmental law cases addressing the issue of Article III
standing. Part IV analyzes the Chevron test and the three opinions by the Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency judges. Part V the advances the belief that section 202(a)(1)
5 Control of Emissions, supra note 1, at 52,933. The EPA also held it should not regulate GHG
emissions from U.S. motor vehicles under the CAA. See Control of Emissions, supra note 1, at
52,925.
6 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
7 Id.
8 Id. at 58. In his majority opinion, Judge Randolph assumed arguendo that “the EPA possessed
statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles.” Id. at 56.
9 Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 433 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
10 Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert.
granted, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (2006).
11 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3of the CAA provides mandatory authority and predicts the outcome of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency. Part VI concludes that failure to
control the production of GHG emissions from new motor vehicles and engines limits the impact
of the CAA to protect the public welfare from threats to the environment.
II. HISTORY OF CLIMATE CHANGE
A. The Evolution of Climate Change Policy
In 1896, Swedish scientist Svante August Arrhenius calculated that carbon dioxide being
spewed into the atmosphere by industrial smokestacks could eventually change the Earth’s
climate by intensifying the greenhouse effect.12 Arrhenius estimated that, at then-current rates of
emission, it would take thousands of years for higher carbon dioxide emissions to have a
perceptible effect.13 At the time, legal action directed at climate change was not a priority for
policy makers and lawyers. However, the rapid industrialization of the twentieth century sent
atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide and other GHGs soaring.14
During the 1980s, scientific discussions about the possibility of global climate change led
to public concern both in the United States and abroad.15 By then, computer climate models
predicted a host of horrendous consequences if emissions of carbon dioxide and other GHGs
were not brought under control within decades rather than centuries.16 Such events included
intense heat waves, melting glaciers, rising sea levels, floods, droughts, tropical storms and
12 Kristin Choo, Feeling the Heat: The Growing Debate Over Climate Change Takes on Legal
Overtones, A.B.A. J., July 2006, at 31.
13 Id.
14 Id. Methane and nitrous oxide were other GHGs affected by the movement towards
industrialization. Id.
15 Control of Emissions, supra note 1, at 52,926.
16 Choo, supra note 12, at 31.
4hurricanes.17 In 1988, the United Nations Environment Programme and the World
Meteorological Organization appointed an international group of scientists called the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to investigate climate change.18 The United
States Senate recognized the IPCC as the preeminent international body established to provide
objective scientific and technical assessments on climate change.19
In 1995, the IPCC’s Second Assessment Report on climate change found that “the
balance of evidence, from changes in global mean surface temperature and from changes in
geographical, seasonal and vertical patterns of atmospheric temperature suggests a discernible
human influence on global climate.”20 After this report, additional data, improved analysis, and
more rigorous evaluation provided the IPCC with a greater understanding of climate change.21
In 2001, it concluded that most of the activities surrounding global warming in the last fifty years
were attributable to human activities.22 Furthermore, the report summarized regional changes in
climate affecting a diverse set of physical and biological systems in many parts of the world.23
B. The Domestic Agenda for Combating Climate Change
In the 1980s, the United States joined other nations to develop the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC).24 Upon approval from the Senate,
17 Id.
18 Final Brief for Petitioners in Consolidated Cases at 7, Massachusetts v. Environmental Prot.
Agency, No. 03-1361 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 24, 2005).
19 Id.; see also S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-55, at 9 (1992) (stating that IPPC’s work is “viewed
throughout most of the international scientific and global diplomatic community as the definitive
statement on the state-of-the-knowledge about global climate change.”).
20 IPPC SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT, SYNTHESIS REPORT 5 (1995).
21 IPPC THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 2 (2001). The report also
determined that the 1990s was the warmest decade since records were first kept in 1861. Id.
22 Id. at 7-8.
23 Id. at 3.
24 Control of Emissions, supra note 1, at 52,926.
5President George H.W. Bush signed the UNFCC in 1992.25 The UNFCC constituted the
international community’s first major step to address climate change on a global level.26 The
Convention sought to stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.27 All parties to it agreed
on the need for further research to determine the level at which GHG concentrations should be
stabilized, acknowledging that “there are many uncertainties in predictions of climate change,
particularly with regard to the timing, magnitude and regional patterns thereof.”28
Shortly before the UNFCC’s adoption, Congress developed the 1990 CAA
amendments.29 In the amendments, Congress called on the EPA to develop information
concerning global climate change and “nonregulatory” strategies for reducing carbon dioxide
emissions.30 A Senate committee included in its bill to amend the CAA a provision requiring the
EPA to set CO[2] emission standards for motor vehicles.31 However, the provision did not
appear on the bill on which the full Senate voted, and the bill eventually enacted remained silent
with regard to motor vehicle carbon dioxide emissions.32 During the same period, other
25 Control of Emissions, supra note 1 at 52,926. The UNFCC went into effect in 1994. Id.
26 J. Kevin Healy & Jeffrey M. Tapick, Climate Change: It’s Not Just a Policy Issue for
Corporate Counsel – it’s a Legal Problem, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 89, 94 (2004). The UNFCC
is credited for the development of the Kyoto Protocol, which mandates that once developed
nations, known as Annex I Parties, ratify the protocol, they must meet individual, legally-binding
emissions targets. Id. at 94-95.
27 Control of Emissions, supra note 1, at 52,926.
28 Control of Emissions, supra note 1, at 52,926.
29 Control of Emissions, supra note 1, at 52,926.
30 Control of Emissions, supra note 1, at 52,926.
31 Control of Emissions, supra note 1, at 52,926.
32 Control of Emissions, supra note 1, at 52,926.
6legislative proposals sought to control GHG emissions, but did not receive enough support from
the majority of Congress.33
In 2001, at the request of the Bush Administration, the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) analyzed some of the key findings in the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report.34 The NAS
report concluded that “a causal linkage” between GHG emissions and global warming “cannot
be unequivocally established.”35 Although the report noted that the earth regularly experiences
climate cycles of global cooling after periods of global warming, it stated that an increase in
carbon dioxide levels is not always accompanied by a corresponding rise in global
temperatures.36 However, the NAS report further concluded that GHG atmospheric
concentrations are increasing “as a result of human activities.”37
After the publication of the NAS report, the United States submitted the U.S. Climate
Action Report 200238 (CAR) to the Secretariat of the UNFCC.39 The CAR recites at length the
detrimental effects to public health and welfare caused by climate change.40 Additionally, it
presented regional assessments determining that a wide variety of adverse effects to the public
33 See, e.g., S. 324, 101st Cong. (1989); S. 1224, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 5966, 101st Cong.
(1990).
34 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY
QUESTIONS (2001). The Academy’s principal operating agency for providing advice to the
federal government on scientific and technical matters is the National Research Council (NRC).
Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 56-57.
35 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 17.
36 Id. at 7, 16. The NRC explained that although carbon dioxide levels increased steadily during
the twentieth century, global temperatures decreased between 1946 and 1975. Id. at 16.
37 Id. at 9.
38 UNITED STATES CLIMATE ACTION REPORT [hereinafter CLIMATE REPORT] (2002).
39 See Final Brief for Petitioners, supra note 18, at 8-9. The EPA served as the lead agency in
the preparation of the Climate Action Report and coordinated the involvement of a dozen other
federal agencies and the Executive Office of the President. See 66 Fed. Reg. 15470
(Environmental Protection Agency Mar. 19, 2001).
40 Final Brief for Petitioners, supra note 18, at 9 (“[H]eat waves are ‘very likely’ to increase in
frequency and severity.”); CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 106.
7welfare are “very likely” or “likely” to occur in the United States as a result of climate change.41
The CAR also recognized that GHG emissions from United States transportation activities
account for a major part of the country’s overall GHG emissions.42
III. CONFRONTING ARTICLE III STANDING
A. Developing Standing Jurisprudence
Early Supreme Court decisions indirectly established standing requirements by limiting
suits to common law forms of action or the statute at issue.43 Since 1944, the Court interpreted
Article III of the U.S. Constitution’s limitation of judicial decisions to cases and controversies by
implying that federal courts should require plaintiffs to meet certain standing criteria to ensure
that the plaintiff has a genuine interest and stake in a case.44 Although Article III establishes the
parameters of the federal judicial branch, it does not contain explicit standing requirements for
suits in federal courts.45 Some legal scholars argue that the Court's development of formal
standing requirements derived from the rise of new administrative agencies during the 1930s and
the need to clarify whether potential beneficiaries of regulation could challenge administrative
decisions.46
41 Final Brief for Petitioners, supra note 18, at 9-10.
42 CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 36. The report noted that nearly two-thirds of GHG
emissions result from motor vehicles. Id. at 40.
43 Robert V. Percival, "Greening" the Constitution - Harmonizing Environmental and
Constitutional Values, 32 ENVTL. L. 809, 827 (2002).
44 Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REV. 163, 170 (1992); Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to
All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1, 22 (2005).
45 Id. Article III indirectly places limits on the federal judicial power by stating that the "judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases ... [and] ... Controversies," thus excluding advisory opinions. See
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.; Sunstein, supra note 44, at 170-75; Mank, supra note 44, at 22.
46 See Mank, supra note 44, at 22-23; Percival, supra note 43, at 827; Sunstein, supra note 44, at
179.
8In previous years, courts issued conflicting decisions about whether to allow standing for
plaintiffs who file suits alleging general injuries to the public at large.47 Regarding cases
involving generalized, abstract injuries affecting the public as a whole, such as misuse of
taxpayer funds48, courts often concluded that it is inappropriate to allow a plaintiff standing to
pursue such a suit because the political branches are better suited than the judicial branch to
resolve such controversies.49 In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.50,
the Court found adequate proof of injury when plaintiffs complained that a proposed nuclear
power plant would expose them to radiation, and that the plant would not be constructed in the
absence of a challenged limitation of liability in case of accident.51 It stated that a court could
deny standing if a suit would raise "general prudential concerns ‘about the proper - and properly
limited - role of the courts in a democratic society.'"52
Other Supreme Court decisions on standing implied that plaintiffs could establish
standing even if they suffered an injury common to many people.53 In United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP)54, the Court declared that "to deny
47 Such cases involve disputes in which every citizen possesses a small, yet common injury.
Mank, supra note 44, at 21.
48 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968) (holding that a federal taxpayer did not have standing
to challenge spending allegedly in violation of Constitution); Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241
F.3d 674, 683-84 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that federal courts require a taxpayer seeking standing
to demonstrate direct injury in a case alleging mishandling of municipal or state tax funds).
49 David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change
Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 40 n.217 (2003); Mank, supra note 44, at 21; Florida
Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 667 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("The plaintiff must show that
he is not simply injured as is everyone else, lest the injury be too general for court action.").
50 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
51 Id.; see also DAVID P. CURRIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 22 (4th ed. 1999).
52 Id. at 80 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
53 Mank, supra note 44, at 22.
54 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (permitting park users to challenge a rate decision of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) on the basis of allegations that it would discourage transportation
of recycled materials).
9standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would
mean that the most injurious and widespread ... actions could be questioned by nobody."55 Two
years later, it held that a plaintiff may be able to satisfy Article III standing requirements "even if
it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants."56 In Warth v. Seldin, the Court
stated that a substantial likelihood of injury can be found after an examination of the pleadings.57
B. The Effect of Lujan
Standing exists only if the complainant suffers an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to
the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.58 In Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife59, the Supreme Court broke new ground in construing the current standing
doctrine.60 In Lujan, the environmental group Defenders of Wildlife (Defenders) argued that the
federal government provided partial funding for dam projects in Sri Lanka and Egypt that would
likely damage the habitat of endangered and threatened species in those countries.61 Defenders
sought standing based on the affidavits of two of its members who traveled to those countries in
the past, were concerned about endangered species in those two countries, and sought to revisit
the countries in the future but had no current travel plans.62
55 Id. at 688.
56 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
57 CURRIE, supra note 51, at 21.
58 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 54 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992)).
59 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
60 Brian Mayer, Climate Change, Insurance, NEPA, and Article III: Does a Policy Holder Have
Standing to Sue a Federal Agency for Failing to Address Climate Change under NEPA?, 74
UMKC L. REV. 435, 442 (2005).
61 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563.
62 Id. at 563.
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A divided Court concluded that the group lacked standing to challenge a Department of
Interior rule interpreting section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA)63 as not applying to
extraterritorial impacts of federal action.64 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that, to
satisfy the injury-in-fact test, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she suffered a “concrete and
particularized” and “actual and imminent” invasion of a legally protected interest.65 Second, it
stated that a causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct.66 Finally, the
plaintiff must show, beyond mere speculation, that his or her injury will be “redressed by a
favorable decision.”67
The Court’s insistence that injury is a constitutional requirement means that Congress
cannot confer standing on a person with nothing to gain by suing.68 If a plaintiff only possesses
a general grievance and seeks relief that provides him no more benefit than the public at large,
there is no injury in fact.69 On the other hand, Congress can often create standing by conferring a
cash bounty on the victorious plaintiff.70 This would assure that the plaintiff’s relief gives him or
her tangible benefit not available to the public at large.71
C. Should the Political Branches Decide?
While serving on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, then-Judge Scalia wrote a law
review article that disagreed with the relaxed approach to standing adopted by the Supreme
63 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 1531-1544 (2000).
64 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578.
65 Id. at 560; Mayer, supra note 60, at 442.
66 Id.
67 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38
(1976)); Mayer, supra note 60 at 442. The third standing prong requires that the plaintiffs’
harms be redressable by favorable judicial decisions. Grossman, supra note 49, at 41.
68 CURRIE, supra note 51, at 22.
69 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.12, at 93 (7th ed. 2004).
70 Id.
71 Id.
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Court and many lower court decisions.72 Scalia favored a narrower approach to standing because
standing doctrine created a "crucial and inseparable element" of separation-of-powers principles,
and more restrictive standing rules would limit judicial interference with the popularly elected
legislative and executive branches."73 He argued that when "allegedly wrongful governmental
action ... affects "all who breathe,'" no one has standing to seek redress in court, and the political
branches should resolve the issue instead.74
Criticizing judges who suggested that courts adopt a more lenient approach to standing in
environmental cases, Scalia questioned "the judiciary's long love affair with environmental
litigation."75 Responding to Judge Skelly Wright's pro-environmentalist opinion in Calvert Cliffs
Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission76 that "our duty, in short, is to see that
important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in
the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy,"77 Scalia suggested that judicial nonenforcement of
certain laws because of standing barriers could actually have positive social impacts.78 He stated
that judges who enforce environmental laws are "likely to be enforcing the political prejudices of
their own class."79 Furthermore, Scalia claimed that the ability to misdirect laws by denying
standing where no particular harm to certain individuals can be said to be one of the prime
engines of social change.80
72 See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).
73 Id. at 881.
74 Id. at 896.
75 Id. at 884.
76 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
77 Id. at 1111.
78 Scalia, supra note 72, at 897.
79 Id. at 896.
80 Id. at 897.
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In Federal Election Commission v. Akins81, the Court sought to clarify its contrasting
decisions about whether plaintiffs who suffer common injuries are entitled to standing. The
Akins Court addressed why it permitted standing in some cases involving widespread injuries,
but denied it in other disputes when "the political process, rather than the judicial process, may
provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance."82 Justice Breyer's majority
opinion reasoned that standing for widely shared, generalized injuries would not suffice if the
harm is both widely shared and also of "an abstract and indefinite nature."83 He maintained that
the Court denied standing if the injury is too abstract, but allowed standing even if many people
suffered the same harm as long as that harm is concrete.84
The Akins Court implied that Congress may grant standing to all citizens concretely
harmed by a particular injury even if every other citizen is similarly adversely affected.85
However, Justice Breyer's majority opinion was fundamentally inconsistent with Justice Scalia's
article and the Lujan decision.86 Justice Breyer's majority opinion implicitly rejected the
conclusion in Lujan that "to permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in
executive officers' compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts” is
to permit Congress to transfer to the judicial branch “the Chief Executive's most important
constitutional duty."87 However, Justice Scalia's central argument in dissent was that the
political branches, not the judiciary, should address broadly held grievances.88
81 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
82 Id. at 23.
83 Id. at 24.
84 Id. at 24-25.
85 Id.
86 Mank, supra note 44, at 38.
87 Id. at 36 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992)); see generally
Cass Sunstein, Information Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U.
13
IV. EXAMINING THE CLEAN AIR ACT
A. The Chevron Test
In Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.89, the Supreme Court
addressed whether the EPA’s decision to allow States to treat all of the pollution-emitting
devices within the same industrial grouping was based on a reasonable construction of the
“stationary source” of section 172(b)(6) of the CAA Amendments of 1977.90 In this case, the
amendments required non-attainment States to establish a permit program regulating “new or
modified major stationary sources” of air pollution.91 The EPA regulation promulgated to
implement this permit requirement allowed a State to adopt a plantwide definition of the term
“stationary source.”92 Under this definition, an existing plant that contains several pollution-
emitting devices may install or modify one piece of equipment without meeting the permit
conditions if the alteration will not increase the total emissions from the plant.93
Several environmental groups argued before the D.C. Circuit that the EPA’s definition of
“stationary source” ran contrary to the terms, legislative history, and purposes of the CAA
amendments.94 The court noted that the relevant part of the amended CAA did not provide an
explicit definition of what Congress envisioned as a stationary source to which the permit
PA. L. REV. 613, 638-53 (1999) (discussing differences in standing philosophy between Lujan
and Akins).
88 Akins, 524 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., joined by O’Connor & Thomas, JJ., dissenting); see generally
Scalia, supra note 72. Justice Scalia argued that the statute should not be interpreted to allow a
private party to bring an executive agency into court to compel its enforcement of the law against
a third party, and second, that if the statute means that, it is unconstitutional because it transfers
from the Executive to the courts the responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.” Akins, 524 U.S. at 37; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 69, at 93 n.205.
89 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
90 See 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (2005).
91 Id.; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839.
92 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6)(i) (2005); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839.
93 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839.
94 Id. at 842 n.7.
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program should apply.95 In light of its conclusion that the legislative history was contradictory at
best, the court reasoned that “the purposes of the non-attainment program” should guide its
decision.96 It stated that the bubble concept was “mandatory” in programs designed merely to
maintain air quality, but held that it was improper in programs enacted to improve air quality.97
Arguing that the purpose of the permit program was to improve air quality, the court held that the
bubble concept was inapplicable and set aside the regulations.98
The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s decision holding that the EPA regulations allowing
states to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same grouping were based on a
reasonable construction of the “stationary source” term in section 172(b)(6).99 Expressing the
unanimous view of the six participating members of the Court, Justice Stevens argued that the
parsing of general terms in the text of the statute would not reveal an actual intent of Congress.100
In reviewing the legislative history of section 172(b)(6), the Court stated that Congress did not
address the issue presented before them by the EPA’s decision.101 Thus, Justice Stevens
reasoned that when a statute fails to provide a specific congressional intent regarding its
application, an agency’s reasonable construction may provide the best source for
interpretation.102
95 National Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court
further stated that the precise issue was not “squarely addressed in the legislative history.” Id.
96 Id. at 726 n.39.
97 Id. at 726.
98 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
99 Id. at 860-61.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 862.
102 Id. at 862-66.
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B. Contrasting the D.C. Circuit’s Opinions in Massachusetts v. EPA
1. Judge Randolph’s Majority Opinion
Writing the opinion for the court, Judge Randolph initially discussed the issue of whether
the petitioners lacked standing under Article III of the Constitution.103 He noted the two
declarations cited as grounds to challenge the EPA’s decision.104 However, Judge Randolph
failed to explicitly state whether the petitioners lacked standing to seek the EPA to enforce the
regulation of GHGs from new motor vehicles.105 Instead, he followed the statutory standing
cases and assumed arguendo that the EPA possessed proper statutory authority under the
CAA.106
Judge Randolph noted that section 202(a)(1) provides the EPA Administrator
considerable discretion in regulating GHGs for new motor vehicles.107 Moreover, he stated that
the Administrator expressed concern that unilateral regulation of American motor vehicle
emissions “could weaken efforts to persuade developing countries to reduce the intensity of
GHGs thrown off by their economies.”108 Judge Randolph also mentioned other scientific
evidence the EPA took into consideration prior to issuing its decision.109 Thus, he concluded
that the EPA Administrator properly exercised his discretion in denying the petition for
rulemaking.110
103 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 54.
104 Id. at 54-55.
105 Id. at 56.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 58.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 58-59.
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2. Judge Sentelle’s Concurrence and Dissent
In concluding that the EPA correctly asserted that the petitioners failed to demonstrate
any injury necessary to establish standing under Article III, Judge Sentelle issued his dissent
from Judge Randolph’s opinion.111 Citing the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Florida Audubon
Society v. Bentsen112, he argued that the alleged harm did not provide a “specific” and
“justiciable” claim for the court to resolve.113 Judge Sentelle reasoned that the claimed injury
was common to all members of the public that should be recommended to the Executive Branch
and Congress for resolution.114 However, he concurred in with Judge Randolph’s decision to
deny the petitioners from final action of the EPA.115
3. Judge Tatel’s Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Tatel initially examined the National Research Council
scientific research on GHGs.116 In addressing the issue of standing, he asserted that only one
petitioner needs to establish the elements of injury, causation and redressability before a court
can reach the merits of the petitioners’ claim.117 Judge Tatel argued that the declarations
submitted by petitioners clearly establish that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts satisfied
each element under Article III.118 Furthermore, he stated that the potential harm that the
111 Id. at 59 (Sentelle, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
112 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
113 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 60 (Sentelle, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge
Sentelle noted that his opinion was not to suggest that the petitioners were without redress. Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 61 (Sentelle, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
116 Id. at 62-64 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 64 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citing Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 373 F.3d 1251, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
118 Id. at 64 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992)). Judge Tatel specifically examined the declarations of Professor Paul Kirshen of Tufts
University, Michael MacCracken, senior scientist on global change at the Office of the U.S.
Global Change Research Program, and Michael Walsh, a consultant on motor vehicle pollution
17
Commonwealth could suffer as a result of lack of regulation by the EPA is a “far cry from the
kind of generalized harm that the Supreme Court has found inadequate to support Article III
standing.”119 Judge Tatel concluded that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts sufficiently
demonstrated its standing and that the court’s jurisdiction was “plain”.120
In addressing the merits, Judge Tatel centered on the language of section 202(a)(1) to
determine if the EPA has the authority to regulate GHG emissions.121 He also discussed other
sections of the CAA to examine the EPA’s discretion.122 Although Judge Tatel acknowledged
that Congress did not provide much regulation on the issue of global warming, he noted that they
instructed the EPA to “be on the lookout for climate-related problems in evaluating risks to
‘welfare’”.123 He went on to cite several CAA provisions addressing the regulation of air
pollutants and establishing air quality standards.124 Judge Tatel further distinguished the
authority presented by the EPA to support its argument by stating that it previously took the
position that it possessed the authority to regulate GHG emissions under section 202(a)(1).125
Accordingly, he concluded that GHGs fell within the EPA’s authority to regulate under section
202(a)(1).126
technology and former director of EPA’s motor vehicle pollution control efforts, to support his
conclusion that Petitioners properly established standing under Article III. Id. at 64-66 (Tatel, J.,
dissenting).
119 Id. at 65 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 67 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 68 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 69-71 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 72 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 73 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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V. PROMOTING REGULATION THROUGH THE CLEAN AIR ACT
A. Article III Standing
Judge Richard Posner observed that there is a scientific consensus that global warming is
a serious problem that may be increased by dissent.127 While scientists continue to debate the
uncertainty regarding the effects of global climate change, litigation relating to its various
aspects is beginning to emerge.128 Hence, the issue of Article III standing continues to arise in
many environmental cases addressing global warming.129 This was the case in Massachusetts
where the D.C. Circuit judges hearing the case made three different approaches to the issue of
standing.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts presented sufficient evidence to support its
position that the EPA’s decision to not regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles would
create significant damage to its environmental policy.130 It further argued that such damage
varied from the other parties seeking the EPA’s regulation of GHG emissions to prevent future
environmental hazards.131 This infringement upon Massachusetts’ ability to properly enforce its
own policies due to lack of federal assistance in enforcing the CAA clearly arises to a “concrete
injury” as the Court’s Article III jurisprudence established. Such an injury derives in connection
with the lack of federal regulation as a result of the EPA’s decision. The petitioners’ only
manner of correcting such inaction would be through an action from the federal courts. Hence,
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts presented enough evidence to meet the requisite elements
of Article III standing.
127 RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 55-58 (2004).
128 Daniel A. Farber, Idea: Uncertainty as a Basis for Standing, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1123, 1128
(2005).
129 Id.; see also Mank, supra note 44.
130 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 64-66.
131 Id.
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Professor Daniel Farber asserts that, despite uncertainties, the risk of global warming is
“large enough to have real economic consequences”.132 He argues that plaintiffs may still be
able to establish standing even though the effects of global warming are speculative at best.
Farber further contends that it is a mistake to think that standing in global warming cases
“depends on proof by the plaintiffs that harmful effects will in fact occur or at least be more
likely than not.”133 He cites economic actors’ reliance on uncertain and low-probability events
as relevant in making financial decisions.134
Farber’s arguments strongly support a new approach to examining Article III standing
with respect to global warming cases. As more scientific evidence regarding climate change
develops, risks of potential damage from natural disasters will remain prevalent throughout the
world. Courts should not allow these risks to continue to grow by failing to address claims for
regulation by avoiding the merits presented. Such action will only postpone the necessary steps
to alleviate any potential damage that is predicted to affect the environment.
Under the current method of evaluating standing in environmental cases, plaintiffs would
have to prove that a particular event was a product of global warming.135 Such a standard applies
even if a court is willing to accept scientific data presented by them.136 While many federal
courts continue to stand by this method of establishing standing, others are beginning to grant
standing to plaintiffs on “global warming grounds”.137 For instance, in Friends of the Earth v.
132 Farber, supra note 128, at 1129.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Choo, supra note 12, at 34.
136 Id.
137 Mayer, supra note 60, at 445 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety
Admin., 912 F.2d 778, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
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Watson138, a federal judge granting standing for plaintiffs challenging the actions of two federal
agencies that contribute to climate change by providing loan guarantees and insurance to
overseas projects that result in increased GHG emissions.139 Judge White reasoned that to
require the plaintiffs to investigate and prove the particular effects of an agency action would
force them to perform the same environmental analysis they sought the action to conduct.140
Within the past several years, natural disasters inflicted catastrophic damage upon many
regions throughout the Earth. The most notable examples of such events include the tsunami that
occurred around the Southeast Asia and the tragedy of Hurricane Katrina. Some claim that as
the level of greenhouse gas in the atmosphere continues to increase, the disparity between
standards for showing causation will likely decrease.141 However, this will only occur once the
courts decide to consider new standards that address the more recent controversies surrounding
global warming.
The standards that many courts apply to address Article III standing do not properly
explore the issues that surround many global warming disputes. Since many appellate courts are
not willing to reevaluate the precedent established in Lujan and the subsequent decisions within
their circuits, a new approach should be implemented to determining whether a plaintiff suffers a
concrete injury as a result of an agency’s refusal to regulate environmental hazards. Such a
standard should permit courts to grant more weight to scientific evidence that supports a
plaintiff’s position that government regulation would bolster the efforts to prevent severe damage
from the environment. Although scientific evidence would not be enough to allow a plaintiff to
138 No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005).
139 Id. The plaintiffs initiated this action pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4335.
140 Id. at *2.
141 Mayer, supra note 60, at 446-47.
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prevail on the merits, it can be sufficient to establish a prima facie claim that can be adequately
resolved through an action by the court presiding over the issue. It is imperative that courts use a
broad analysis in evaluating the scope of a “concrete injury” so as to include evidence of
potential damage that would arise as a result of failure to utilize statutes implemented to prevent
environmental disasters. This becomes necessary when considering the complex nature of
determining potential consequences in regulating global warming.
B. Interpreting the Clean Air Act provisions
1. Examining Congress’ Intent
The CAA clearly states that the EPA Administrator “shall by regulation
prescribe…standards” to govern the emissions of air pollutants from motor vehicles.142 Such
language sufficiently establishes Congress’ intent for the EPA to enforce the powers granted
within section 202(a)(1). In making policy decisions regarding GHG emissions, the
Administrator must determine whether U.S. motor vehicles “cause, or contribute to, air
pollution”.143 Furthermore, while Congress provided discretion in evaluating whether global
warming “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger” welfare, this does not pertain to setting
policies outside of the scope of the CAA.144
The EPA concedes that motor vehicles emit GHGs in significant quantities.145 Such
information furthers Judge Tatel’s statement that the Administrator’s refusal to regulate GHG
emissions is in violation of the CAA.146 The petitioners’ scientific evidence reasonably
concludes that U.S. motor vehicles pose a significant threat to global warming. Moreover, the
142 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
143 Id.
144 See Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
145 CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 40.
146 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 81.
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EPA approved the NAS report’s independent assessment of relevant scientific research on
potential hazards from the effects of climate change.147 At this moment, the EPA’s discretionary
authority under the CAA would end and the Administrator would be required to regulate GHG
emissions from new motor vehicles.
Judge Tatel argues that the EPA is free to petition Congress to amend the CAA to provide
them with discretionary authority to regulate GHG emissions after making an endangerment
finding.148 While such an action is permissible, the EPA must obey the provisions of the CAA as
they currently stand.149 The refusal to regulate GHG emissions on the basis of policy reasons
beyond the statutory standard of section 202(a)(1) only stretches the EPA’s lawful discretion.
Furthermore, such actions avoid Congress’ “express directive” as provided under the CAA.150
Accordingly, the EPA failed to properly interpret section 202(a)(1) with respect to regulating
GHG emissions from new motor vehicles.
2. The D.C. Circuit’s Mischaracterization of the Clean Air Act
Because agencies are held accountable to the public through the Executive Branch,
helping an agency reach its preferred outcome in a way that bypasses political repercussions
insulates the Executive and diminishes public accountability.151 Judge Randolph never explicitly
stated that he interpreted the EPA’s petition denial as a finding of no endangerment.152 Instead,
he refers to its decision by using terms such as “refusal to regulate”, “decision to forego
147 Control of Emissions, supra note 1, at 52,930.
148 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 81.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Recent Case, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir.
2005), 119 HARV. L. REV. 2620, 2627 (2006).
152 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 57.
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rulemaking”, and “regulatory forbearance”.153 These statements would presume that the EPA
conducted a thorough study on the effects of U.S. motor vehicles with respect to climate change
when, in fact, such actions did not occur.
If the EPA determined that GHGs met the statutory standard of section 202(a)(1), one
would presume that Judge Randolph to require the EPA to regulate them.154 But because he
proceeded to find for the EPA, his approach was to treat the agency as making the requisite
finding of no endangerment.155 To reach this conclusion would be to mischaracterize the CAA
with respect to its mandatory authority delegated under section 202(a)(1). Furthermore, this
reasoning would allow agencies to escape public accountability in their decision to enforce
policies established by the political branches.
Judge Randolph’s opinion assumes to establish a finding that the EPA did not present
before the court. This ruling serves to extend the Administrator’s discretion provided by
Congress. Furthermore, Judge Randolph’s decision considers policies unrelated to the statutory
standard applicable under the CAA.156 Moreover, it grants the EPA the authority to circumvent
the mandates of the CAA any time it thinks the statute’s approach unwise.157 Such judicial
interpretation could severely restrict the ability of Congress to effectively establish laws for the
Executive Branch to enforce.
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion stands to weaken the CAA and its ability to effectively protect
the public welfare from environmental hazards. The decision presented an opportunity to hold
the EPA accountable to the public by making a threshold judgment on the impact of GHG
153 Id. at 57-58.
154 Recent Case, supra note 151, at 2626.
155 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 57.
156 Recent Case, supra note 151, at 2627.
157 Id.
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emissions from new motor vehicles. Instead, it established a policy for the EPA to avoid the
CAA’s mandatory regulation duties while preserving its discretionary authority. If federal courts
continue with this approach, several policies established by Congress will be deemed inefficient
in their respective implementation.
C. The Likely Outcome of Massachusetts v. EPA
There are some signs that the White House and Capitol Hill may be starting to give more
attention to the implications of climate change.158 For instance, the Senate adopted a nonbinding
resolution calling for a national mandatory program to “slow, stop and reverse” emissions of
GHGs.159 Furthermore, the Bush administration is pushing for more voluntary energy
conservation and reliance on alternative fuels.160 Such actions will likely prompt the Court to
move in the direction of GHG regulation under the CAA.
Since its decision in Lujan, the Court established a broader test in determining whether a
plaintiff possesses proper standing under Article III.161 In Akins, Justice Breyer implied that
Congress may grant standing to all citizens concretely harmed by a particular injury even if
every other citizen is similarly adversely affected.162 Such reasoning shifted the Court’s Article
III jurisprudence away from Justice Scalia’s philosophy as stated in Lujan. Moreover, federal
courts seem to be moving towards a trend of establishing standing with respect to the CAA and
other statutes in similar environmental cases.163 Given these recent developments, the Court
should find that the petitioners claim meets the three requirements regarding Article III standing.
158 Choo, supra note 12, at 35.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Federal Election Commissions v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
162 Id. at 24-25.
163 See generally Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2004).
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Due to the significance placed upon policies addressing global warming, those supporting
wide agency discretion contend that reliance on scientific data is insufficient to impact the EPA’s
policy surrounding regulating GHG emissions. However, if the Court conducts the proper test,
the EPA should be required to enforce GHG policies as mandated under the CAA. Recent
scientific discoveries support the impact that GHG regulations have towards assisting state
governments in enforcing their respective policies within their territories. Moreover, there is
nothing in the CAA that permits the EPA to exercise discretion once evidence of an
endangerment finding is presented. Such evidence and growing public concern with respect to
environmental hazards shows that agency discretion should not be used to limit the ability to
enforce statutes as Congress intended.
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of climate change policy evidences the contention that global warming cases
present different controversies that do not appear in most Article III cases. Because of this, the
Supreme Court should examine global warming cases by applying a broader test to determine if
the petitioners lack standing under Article III. In the case of Massachusetts v. Environmental
Protection Agency, the Court should not overlook such factors when confronting climate change
policy.
States and their citizens depend on the Executive Branch to carry out the policies
established by Congress for the benefit of the public. Yet, to permit federal agencies to exercise
discretion in areas where Congress did not provide such action only hinders the ability to enforce
federal statutes. The Supreme Court can prevent such actions by upholding the mandatory
authority granted to the EPA under section 202(a)(1) of the CAA. Such a move will serve to
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establish a new direction in the development of global warming policy for the benefit of the
public.
